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How big is leakage from forestry carbon credits?  Estimates from a global model 
 
Introduction 
Currently, there is substantial concern over global warming, greenhouse gas emissions and their 
potential effects on society. According to the IPCC (2001), about 43% of total carbon emissions 
from  1850  to  1998  have  remained  in  the  atmosphere,  instead  of  being  absorbed  by  oceans, 
biomass, organic matter and soils. Deforestation alone has contributed to about one quarter of all 
these emissions (Schoene, 2007). To deal with  this problem, much research has delved into 
forestry’s potential for carbon sequestration. For example, Nabuurs et al. (2007) and Richards 
and Stokes (2004) assert that about 7 billion tons of carbon dioxide per year could be sequestered 
for US$60 per ton of CO2. This amount of CO2 storage could provide up to one-third of total 
global abatement during this century (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003 and Tavoni et al., 2007). 
  To  encourage  forestry  carbon  sequestration,  researchers  have  supported  the 
implementation  of  forestry  carbon  credits.  For  example,  since  2006,  the  UNFCC’s  Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has awarded credits to projects in developing countries for 
certified  emission  reductions  (CERs).  These  have  focused  on  waste  management,  methane 
capture  and  renewable  electricity  generation.  Currently  there  is  one  CDM-certified  soil 
conservation  project  in  Moldova  and  one  reforestation  project  in  the  Guangxi  Watershed  in 
China.  CERs are equivalent to one ton of CO2 if the project developers can prove that additional 
CO2 reductions have occurred as a result of the project (UNFCCC). Since these can be traded (at 
a market price), industrialized countries have more flexibility in achieving their Kyoto Protocol 
emissions standards. They also provide developing nations an innovative way to obtain funds for 
growth and reduce CO2 emissions. Presently, the UNFCC has discussed providing economic 3 
 
incentives  for  the  reduction  of  emissions  through  deforestation  and  degradation  (REDD)  by 
pricing the carbon stored in forests (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008). 
  The  potential  for  reductions  in  deforestation  to  contribute  to  climate  mitigation  are 
possibly  quite  large,  given  the  scale  of  overall  emissions  (e.g.,  Kindermann  et  al.,  2008).  
However, a number of important concerns have been raised about the potential for REDD to 
become  an  acceptable  climate  mitigation  tool,  including  leakage.  Leakage  can  be  defined  at 
many  scales,  but  it  reflects  the  idea  that  if  carbon  policies  have  incomplete  geographical 
coverage, the carbon gains in regions where policies induce carbon storage may partially be 
offset by losses elsewhere that are induced by these policies (see discussion in Murray et al., 
2007).  Leakage in forest carbon projects has been examined thus far within countries by Murray 
et al. (2004) for the United States, and Sohngen and Brown (2004) for Bolivia, but international 
leakage in carbon has not yet been examined. This paper begins to address the potential for 
leakage  if  policies  to  address  REDD  are  widely  implemented,  but  only  some  countries  are 
involved.  
  Leakage  across  countries  can  result  from  price  adjustments  along  several  different 
dimensions.    First,  incentives  to  increase  carbon  in  forests  could  cause  landowners  to  alter 
management practices to increase carbon sequestration. For example, landowners may increase 
rotation  ages  (e.g.,  Daigneault  et  al.,  2009;  Sohngen  and  Brown,  2008),  which  would  cause 
landowners to withhold timber from markets, and which in turn would cause timber prices to 
rise.  Second, carbon incentives likely will cause some landowners to hold forests that they 
would otherwise liquidate and convert to other uses (e.g., in the tropics) and they likely will 
cause other landowners to plant forests on land currently used in some lower value activities.  
Both of these actions would have effects on timber prices by shifting supply across regions and 4 
 
time.  The second set of actions, however, would be expected to influence land rental values in 
the agricultural sector as well, by shifting land between uses. 
  When  considering  leakage,  adjustments  in  both  timber  and  agricultural  markets  are 
important to measure.  For this analysis, though, we are only able address the adjustments likely 
to occur in timber markets.  Specifically, in this paper, we utilize a forestry and land use model 
to focus on the implications of different types of carbon policies on global leakage caused by 
timber price adjustments.  We begin by specifying the model, the baseline, and the optimal 
global policy.  We then introduce a policy that focuses effort only on regions where deforestation 
is occurring, e.g., developing tropical countries. We compare and contrast the efficiency of the 
global optimal policy and the alternative policy.  
   
Literature Review 
 
Much research has endeavored into the determinants of leakage and definite ways of indentifying 
it. Aukland et al. (2003) categorize leakage into primary (when greenhouse gas benefits of a 
project are counteracted by increased emissions elsewhere) and secondary (when the project’s 
output  creates  incentives  to  increase  GHG  emissions  elsewhere).  These,  in  turn,  are  further 
classified into: activity shifting and market effects (Schwarze et al., 2002). It is important to note, 
however, that these two types may be conversely related because the displacement of activity 
allows the market to clear and vice versa. Distinguishing between each type of leakage and the 
main factors contributing to it is essential in being able to minimize a project’s off-site effects. 
For this reason, Aukland et al. (2003) suggest that in order to measure and quantify leakage it is 5 
 
important to establish a baseline and find who are causing it (baseline agents), what is happening 
(baseline drivers), causes and motivations and indicators. 
  To estimate leakage, most authors have focused on project-level analyses. For example, 
the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia (Brown et al., 2000) consisted in setting 
aside  natural  forests  that  could  potentially  be  used  for  logging  and  agricultural  practices. 
Sohngen and Brown (2004) used a dynamic optimization Bolivian timber model to estimate 
market leakage (project price effects) within the country’s boundaries under different baseline 
scenarios.  Leakage  is  calculated  as  the  percentage  of  (non-discounted)  cumulative  carbon 
emissions minus net carbon savings. Their estimates of leakage range from less than 10% to 42% 
depending on the baseline assumptions related to the time period, amount of carbon sequestered 
globally, capital adjustment constraints and demand elasticities. 
  Relating leakage with deforestation, Chomitz (2002) posits that leakage might be high 
when  a  project  affects  the  people  subsisting  from  the  land,  while  it  may  be  lower  when 
deforestation is related to markets because the latter can react by a change in prices. In addition, 
both conservation and energy projects can incur in significant leakage that could be more than 
100%. This depends on the price elasticities of supply and demand for fuel and agricultural 
products and the scope of the project. 
  Wear  and  Murray  (2004)  built  and  econometric  model  that  integrated  the  supply, 
demand, and market of US softwood lumber and timber to assess the effects of different policies 
imposed  in  these  markets  that  could  reduce  harvests  or  affect  prices.  Using  this  general 
equilibrium approach, their results show that the policies generated significant market effects due 
to an increase in prices. The targeted areas reduced production while other areas with fewer 
restrictions increased their market share and gained significant benefits. The amount of leakage 6 
 
varied depending on the scope of analysis: regional leakage was 43%, national leakage was 58%, 
while continental leakage (U.S. and Canada) was 84%. 
  Similarly, Murray et al. (2004) used a general equilibrium analysis of the timber market 
to measure leakage of different carbon sequestration activities in the forestry sector and apply it 
to econometric and optimization models. Creating a specific expression for leakage estimation 
that allows for comparative statics, their results suggest that smaller projects tend to have less 
leakage in absolute terms, but more leakage relative to its benefits. Leakage estimates range less 
than  10%  to  more  than  90%  depending  on  the  activity  and  region  where  carbon  is  being 
sequestered. Focusing on agricultural soil carbon sequestration, Murray et al. (2007) found that 
changes in tillage and harvest practices have the potential to store additional carbon. However, 
these projects can incur in significant leakage if they affect the yields or costs of production and 
prices. In comparison to land set-asides, changing tillage practices reduces leakage because the 
former reduces land supply, resulting in leakage estimates of 20% - 100%. 
  Evaluating forest conservation, Gan and McCarl (2007), calculated potential leakage in 
the timber market due to both activity displacement and market (price) effects between countries. 
They  developed  an  analytical  framework  for  measuring  leakage  using  the  supply  and  price 
elasticities of demand for forestry products and a country cooperation coefficient and found that 
cooperation reduces leakage if many countries are involved. Leakage estimates range from 42% - 
95%  where  activity  displacement  will  move  from  21%  -  75%  of  production  to  developing 
nations, especially those in the tropics.  
  Using  a  global  approach,  Lee  et  al.  (2007)  evaluated  the  global  effects  of  carbon 
emissions  reductions  in  the  agricultural  sector  using  an  optimization  model  that  included 
agricultural production, consumption and trade, as well as variables that affect greenhouse gas 7 
 
emissions mitigation. They found that those countries directly implementing mitigation efforts 
bear its costs, while un-regulated countries not involved in emissions reductions will increase 
production and disseminate GHG emission mitigation benefits. As the price of carbon increases 
in the country implementing the mitigation policies, production and exports decrease and the 
prices for agricultural commodities increase, moving production to cheaper  areas, leading to 
activity  displacement  leakage.  They  found  that  consumers  are  the  net  losers  of  agriculture 
mitigation  policies  due  to  the  price  increase  in  agricultural  commodities.  In  addition,  they 
concluded that to reduce leakage, more countries should work together in mitigation practices.  
The implementation of the REDD mechanism by the UNFCCC has brought much of the 
carbon storage attention to areas with plenty of forest availability since these areas would then be 
able to obtain economic benefits from their carbon stock. Through the CDM, reforestation and 
afforestation  projects  that  can  prove  to  sequester  additional  amounts  of  carbon  are  given 
monetary incentives equal to the value of the carbon stored. Silver et al. (2000) and others argue 
that reforestation in tropical areas has the potential to be a significant source of carbon offsets for 
approximately 40 – 80 years. Deforestation may  contribute to around  25% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions (Schoene, 2007). For these reasons, it is important to evaluate the effects of 
reductions of deforestation and afforestation and the potential leakage implications of each. 
Evaluating land eligible for CDM afforestation and reforestation projects, Zomer et al. 
(2008) found that about 749 Mha are appropriate for these kinds of project, of which 46% of the 
land is found in South America and 27% in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Asian countries, however, 
have  less  land  availability  of  which  almost  25%  is  degraded.  Some  authors  have  analyzed 
leakage  in  specific  projects  in  the  aforementioned  areas.  For  example,  Lasco  et  al.  (2007) 
evaluated  the  implementation  of  different  land-use  activities  that  can  sequester  additional 8 
 
amounts of carbon in the upper magat watershed in the Philippines and found that the leakage 
amount depends on the technology adoption rate; from 3.7 M Tg C to 8.1 M Tg C under a 
baseline and project scenario. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Vagen et al. (2005) found that soil carbon 
sequestration, through agroforestry or natural fallow systems can sequester from 0.1 Mg C to 5.3 
Mg C per hectare per  year. In India, Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) established that 
implementing a scenario offsetting about 50% of carbon emissions can sequester up to 78 Mt C 
per year, mainly through agroforestry. 
The largest tropical forest, the Brazilian Amazon, has undergone continuous degradation 
and deforestation since the construction of the Transamazon Highway, especially along the “arc 
of deforestation” or the southern and eastern edges (Fearnside, 2005). Laurance et al. (2002) 
suggest that deforestation in this area is not only affected by highways, but also by the amount of 
people that settle in the areas surrounding it and the increasingly severe dry seasons that have 
recently affected the region.  Thus, by reducing the rate at which the Amazon is degraded and 
deforested, less carbon is emitted to the atmosphere.  
Other research on the Brazilian Amazon has focused on the causes of deforestation and 
degradation  and/or  the  amount  of  land  that  has  been  affected  (Skole  and  Tucker,  1993  and 
Morton et al., 2005). These studies suggest that there is great potential for carbon storage in Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brazilian Amazon. Because of the CDM and REDD mechanisms, it 
is important to consider afforestation and reforestation activities, as well as degradation and 
reducing deforestation.  Leakage, however, has  not been as investigated and discussed in the 
literature. Some estimates of leakage are available for specific markets and projects, but global 
and regional-level analyses have yet to be fully developed.  
 9 
 
Model and Description of Analysis 
 
The present paper uses a global forestry and land use model that optimizes the distribution of 
timber age classes and the area of land in forests.  The model is built upon the global timber 
model  described  in  (Sohngen  and  Mendelsohn,  2007).  Several  important  updates  have  been 
included in this version of the model.  First, the model has been expanded from 13 regions to 16 
regions (Table 1). Second, the model adopts constant elasticity of transformation functions to 
specify the land supply side (see Hertel et al., 2008). These constant elasticity of transformation 
functions  are  used  to  develop  constant  elasticity  land  supply  functions  for  forestry  that  are 
dependent on rents in other land using sectors (e.g., agriculture and livestock).  In principle, these 
rents can be modeled endogenously, but for this analysis, we assume they are fixed between the 
baseline and the carbon price scenarios.  Third, the forest inventory data has been updated for 
many regions and we have allocated all forests into agro-ecological zones (AEZs), as described 
in Sohngen et al. (2009).  There are up to 18 AEZs within each of the 16 global regions.   
The model is solved in decadal time steps for 15 decades using GAMS. It solves for the 
optimal age class distribution in forests, the optimal intensity to manage forests (e.g., US$ per 
hectare investment in timber quantity and quality, as well as carbon quantity), and the area of 
forests in each of the AEZs.  Land supply functions are specified for each AEZ, such that each 
forest type in each AEZ is assumed to compete directly with other forest types and other land 
uses  within  the  AEZ.    Competition  across  AEZs  does  occur  indirectly  through  timber  price 
adjustments.  
The baseline scenario assumes a path of crop and livestock rents for each AEZ in each of 
the 16 regions and consequently a set of land rental functions for timber in each AEZ. Demand 10 
 
for forestry products shifts outward over time as income rises (income elasticity is set at 0.87 and 
price elasticity is set at 1.0).  Two sets of scenarios are then simulated across a range of carbon 
prices.  The first set of scenarios assumes that policy is global, and any gain in carbon in any part 
of  the  world  will  be  credited.    Such  a  global  set  of  credits  is  the  same  as  Sohngen  and 
Mendelsohn  (2003)  although  they  solved  carbon  prices  endogenously  with  an  integrated 
assessment model.  The second set of scenarios assumes that carbon credits are gained only 
through  actions  undertaken  in  tropical  developing  countries.    The  regions  where  carbon 
payments are made in this second set of scenarios are:  Brazil and the Rest of South America, 
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Under the baseline scenario, carbon prices are US$0 t CO2, thus it represents a policy 
where no regions are awarded carbon payments.  As carbon prices increase, it is expected that 
aboveground  carbon  storage  also  rises  as  the  regions  obtaining  the  payments  become  more 
motivated to sequester additional carbon.  Constant carbon prices assume that climate change 
damages  are also constant, which is unrealistic.  However, to calculate the present value of 
aboveground  carbon  sequestration  under  each  scenario  it  necessary  to  make  this  conjecture 
because it is the only way to theoretically discount carbon.   
To determine the marginal costs of carbon storage, it is first necessary to run the model 
for constant payment levels ranging from US$10 t CO2 to US$900 t CO2.  Each region of the 
world is subject to the same constant carbon prices under each scenario.  Using these results, 
cumulative carbon gains are calculated between the baseline and the scenario for each decade.  
Then, the present value of carbon for the world and the developing regions is evaluated for the 
first 100 years at a 5% discount rate.  11 
 
  Leakage occurs if the gains of implementing a carbon sequestration project in one region 
are offset by increased emissions somewhere else.  Under the first set of scenarios all regions are 
awarded the same payment, so leakage is not present.  The second set of scenarios, however, 
awards carbon credits only to tropical developing countries.  This policy opens up the possibility 
of  incurring  in  leakage  in  the  regions  not  obtaining  carbon  credits.    Therefore,  to  measure 
leakage I calculate the difference between the global marginal costs of sequestration and those of 
the developing regions obtaining carbon credits.  If leakage is present, then policymakers are 




The model is solved without carbon payments to all regions for 15 decades to obtain a baseline 
scenario.  From figure 1 (see section after references for all figures and tables), it is clear that 
Brazil and the rest of the South American nations have the highest amount of carbon sequestered 
due to forest carbon stored in the Amazon rainforest as well as other tropical forest regions in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, among others.  In 2050, for example, Brazil has the potential of sequestering 
about 43,387 Tg of carbon, while the other South American nations can sequester up to 19,655 
Tg  of  carbon.    These  regions  are  followed  by  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Southeast  Asia  with 
sequestration amounts ranging from 10,852 - 9,690 Tg of carbon during 2050. 
  The aforementioned results are expected since most of the world’s leading rainforests, the 
lungs of the Earth, are located in Brazil, South America and Southeast Asia. With the current rate 
of deforestation, aboveground carbon decreases at a rate of approximately 2% to 4% per year for 12 
 
Brazil,  the  rest  of  South  America,  and  Southeast  Asia.  Although  this decline  is  consistently 
negative for the first two regions, it is variable between years for Southeast Asia.   
Although aboveground carbon storage in the tropical forest regions decreases through 
time, figure 2 shows that timber output in these regions increase.  Since these regions do not 
have climate mitigation programs put in place under the baseline scenario, their governments do 
not have incentives to implement policies that protect their carbon stocks.  Thus, tropical forest 
dwellers and timber concessionaires are not prohibited from exploiting the land or supervised to 
guarantee its adequate management.  The negative trend in carbon stocks and positive timber 
output  is  also  consistent  with  added  pressure  by  the  world’s  rising  population  to  forests, 
agricultural, and pasture lands.  
After obtaining the results of the baseline scenario, the dynamic optimization model is re-
solved by awarding carbon credits to all regions of the world in one scenario, and only to tropical 
forest  regions  in  another  scenario  (Brazil,  rest  of  South  America,  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and 
Southeast Asia).  Carbon credits are constant for each of the 15 decades and range from US$10 
dls per Tg C to US$900 dls per Tg.  It is expected that these credits have interesting effects on 
the timber market which merit some scrutiny.   
Figure 3 and plots the decadal timber prices assuming a carbon payment of US$100 per 
Tg carbon for each of the scenarios and the baseline; the dashed line represents global timber 
prices under a policy where carbon credits are awarded to all the regions while the dotted line 
represents  global  timber  prices  when  only  tropical  developing  regions  are  awarded  carbon 
credits.  The first observation that warrants some attention is that prices in the business-as-usual 
scenario and that of the carbon credits only to the developing world scenario follow a similar 
path.  This implies that the effect on timber prices of carbon credits to the developing world 13 
 
(Brazil, rest of South America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) is minor.  This result 
makes sense since the largest timber suppliers (US and Europe) are not directly affected by the 
carbon policy.  
On the other hand, if policy-makers award global carbon credits, the effect on timber 
prices are quite different.  Initially, global timber prices are approximately 16% higher than the 
baseline,  but  within  two  decades  they  become  lower  than  the  business-as-usual  scenario.  
Remember that global carbon payments are awarded to conserve existing forests and sequester 
additional amounts of carbon.  Since these are now affecting the leading timber producers, a 
possible explanation for the disparity between the baseline and the world is that timber suppliers 
take some time to adapt to the new carbon policies.  These initially reduce the amount of timber 
supplied so that timber prices increase.  Nevertheless, within two decades, timber suppliers adapt 
to the new climate policy and are able to increase timber production, leading to a timber price 
decrease compared to the baseline.  
  Figure 4 reveals the marginal costs curves of the US and the tropical developing regions 
chosen for the present  analysis when  awarding global carbon credits.   The regions with the 
highest marginal costs are also those that have the highest aboveground carbon storage as shown 
in figure 1 (Brazil and the rest of South America). The marginal costs of storing an additional 
teragram of carbon increase rapidly in these regions until they reach 4.61 Tg C/yr and 4.49 Tg 
C/yr. The US and Sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest marginal costs of carbon storage ranging 
from 0.19 Tg C/yr to 2.55 Tg C/yr. Southeast Asia is the intermediate region in this group, with 
marginal costs ranging from 0.75 to 4.07 teragrams of carbon per year.  
  Considering that all countries are awarded carbon payments to protect their stocks, this 
scenario can be thought of as the optimal conservationist policy. This does not mean, however, 14 
 
that it is the most efficient policy because it is the most expensive plan. The present policy does 
not take into consideration whether some regions have a comparative advantage in sequestering 
additional  amounts  of  carbon.  For  example,  certain  timbers  can  sequester  more  carbon  than 
others depending on their type and their age, so that some forests can store more carbon than 
others. Also, the reader has to keep in mind that the short-term effect on prices and quantity 
varies greatly from the business-as-usual scenario which the world will have to adapt to.  
Instead of awarding carbon credits to all regions, governments might choose to provide 
payments to only certain nations that they believe are more at risk of affecting climate change, 
such as those with high levels of deforestation.  Thus, the analysis will now focus on the effects 
of implementing carbon payment policies to the tropical developing nations of Brazil, the rest of 
South America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  The first result to consider is that from 
figures 3 and 4 in the appendix timber prices and quantities are not very different from those of 
the business-as-usual scenario under the new carbon credit policy.  This is a plausible result since 
the world’s largest timber producers are not affected by the policy. 
Then, figure 5 displays the marginal cost curves of aboveground carbon storage for the 
regions obtaining the credits.  Analogous to the analysis above, Brazil and the rest of South 
America have the largest marginal costs in comparison with Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  In general, the marginal costs when these regions are obtaining payments are higher than 
when policy-makers implement a global carbon payment scheme. 
The focus of this paper is to demonstrate that leakage is an important phenomenon to take 
into  consideration  when  implementing  carbon  sequestration  projects  with  credits  for  timber 
carbon  storage  and  to  obtain  estimates  of  the  magnitude  of  leakage  under  different  policy 
scenarios.  Table 2 (see pg. 28) shows leakage calculations under scenario 2; that is when Brazil, 15 
 
the rest of South America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are obtaining carbon credits.  
The second column is related to the global marginal costs occurring under the second scenario 
averaged over 100 years; that is, the marginal costs of carbon storage of the globe under a policy 
where the developing tropical regions are awarded carbon credits.  The third column represents 
the  marginal  costs  of  carbon  storage  only  of  the  developing  regions  over  10  decades;  the 
marginal cost of Brazil, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of South America.  That 
is, it represents the marginal costs of carbon storage that the world is paying for.  If the global 
marginal costs of carbon under a specific carbon price are less than those of the regions obtaining 
the credits, then there is leakage.  This implies that there are increased carbon emissions in 
regions not awarded carbon credits due to market or subsistence effects after greenhouse gas 
reducing policies are implemented.  
  The  fourth  column  of  table  2  displays  the  results  for  leakage  calculations  when 
developing  tropical  regions  are  obtaining  carbon  credits.  As  carbon  prices  increase,  leakage 
decreases. Though there could be many reasons for this behavior, one potential explanation is 
that as carbon prices increases, governments awarded credits have more incentives to enforce 
and supervise carbon sequestration policies.  Timber producers and forest dwellers that depend 
on the land are awarded more compensation for foregoing their previous activities and incurring 
in  newer  non-greenhouse  gas  emitting  activities.    Thus,  carbon  storage  increases  as  prices 
increase at a faster rate than leakage increases in regions not provided with carbon credits.  
 
Conclusion 
As  the  world’s  climate  becomes  more  and  more  unpredictable,  many  countries  have  started 
implementing climate change mitigation policies involving the use of renewable resources.  To 16 
 
reduce global warming, scientists have shown that carbon sequestration is effective in decreasing 
greenhouse gases.  Thus, some international organizations have started motivating projects that 
can store carbon in different sources, such as the ocean, biomass, organic matter and soils. One 
of  these  institutions  is  the  UNFCC’s  Clean  Development  Mechanism  (CDM),  which  has 
awarded credits to projects in developing countries for certified emissions reductions (CERs).   
  Nowadays, most of the world’s carbon emissions are coming from developing nations 
that lack the institutions necessary to regulate forest deforestation and degradation.    For this 
reason, the UNFCC has also initiated actions to provide credits for projects that can effectively 
reduce carbon emissions caused by deforestation and degradation (REDD).  These projects can 
reduce  global  warming  significantly,  but  the  effects  that  these  can  have  on  the  worldwide 
markets has caused some trepidation in their quick implementation.  One of the main concerns is 
the potential of these projects to incur in leakage, or when the gains of implementing a carbon 
mitigation policy in one region are offset by increased carbon emissions somewhere else. 
  Therefore, the present paper focuses on the potential effects of implementing two carbon 
mitigation  policies:  global  carbon  credits  vs.  carbon  credits  to  developing  tropical  regions 
represented by Brazil, the rest of South America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  To 
estimate aboveground carbon storage, we use a forestry and land use model based on the global 
timber model described in Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2007) which optimizes the distribution of 
timber age classes and the area of land in forests for 16 regions.  The model is solved for 150 
years in 15 decade steps using GAMS for each of the policy scenarios under constant carbon 
prices that range from US$0 tC to US$900 tC.   
  The baseline scenario (when no carbon credits are awarded) indicates that Brazil and the 
rest of South America have the highest carbon storage potential. After running the models for 17 
 
both scenarios and all payment levels, the results on the timber market differ depending on the 
regions that obtain the carbon credits. When only the developing regions are awarded payments, 
timber prices through time are similar to those of the baseline scenario, so we can conclude that 
these regions have minor effects on the timber market. When the world, however, is awarded 
carbon credits, results indicate that short term timber prices are high while in the long term, 
prices decrease, consistent with improvements in carbon storage technology and added pressure 
of the world’s population on the timber market.  
  Using the results provided by the model, the marginal costs of carbon sequestration are 
calculated by estimating the annual present value of aboveground carbon storage using a 5% 
discount  rate.    The  marginal  cost  curves  indicate  that  the  regions  with  the  greatest  storage 
potential under the baseline also have the highest marginal costs.  These are also higher when 
only  developing  regions  are  provided  carbon  credits  than  when  global  carbon  payments  are 
implemented.  Finally, leakage, derived as the difference between the marginal costs of the world 
and those of the developing tropical regions awarded credits, ranges from 14% to 2%, decreasing 
as carbon prices increase. This could imply that if policymakers choose to implement higher 
prices, carbon storage increases at a faster rate than carbon emissions in regions not awarded 
payments.  
  The  current  paper  only  presents  leakage  analysis  for  the  timber  market  under  two 
different carbon scenarios.  A more interesting case involves adjustments in both the timber and 
agricultural markets.  Therefore, future research should focus on improving the global timber 
model to include the agricultural sector and provide marginal cost and leakage estimates under 
different carbon prices.  
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Fig. 1: Baseline Scenario of Aboveground Carbon Storage (in Tg C) 
from 2010 - 2100 
Brazil





































Fig. 2: Timber Output (in Tg C) for Tropical Forest Regions under 
the Baseline Scenario
Brazil






































Fig. 3: Decadal  Timber Prices at Carbon Payment of $100 dls per Tg  








































Marginal Cost of Carbon (Tg C)
Fig. 4: Marginal Cost Curves for  US and Developing Regions when all 
Regions Obtain Carbon Payments
US












































Marginal Cost of Carbon (Tg C)
Fig. 5: Marginal Cost Curves for Developing Regions Obtaining 
Carbon Payments





Table 1: 16 regions of Global Timber Model 
   Region  Countries 
1  US  United States 
2  CHINA  China, Hong Kong 
3  BRAZIL  Brazil 
4  CANADA  Canada 
5  RUSSIA  Russia 
6  EU ANNEX I  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
   Germany, U.K. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
   Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
   Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
   Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
   Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Rest of EFTA 
7  EU NON ANNEX I  Rest of Europe except EU ANNEX I 
8  SOUTH ASIA  Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia 
9  CENTRAL AMERICA  Mexico, Rest of Caribbean 
10  REST OF SOUTH AMERICA  Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
   Rest of South America 
11  SUB SAHARAN AFRICA  Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, 
   Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Uganda, 
   Rest of South Africa 
12  SOUTH EAST ASIA  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
   Thailand, Vietnam, rest of Southeast Asia 
13  OCEANIA  Australia, New Zealand, Rest of Oceania 
14  JAPAN  Japan 
15  AFRICA MIDDLE EAST  Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of Middle East, 
   Rest of North Africa 
16  EAST ASIA  Korea, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia 





Table 2: Leakage when Developing Regions 







Regions  Leakage 
US$10  1.18  1.35  14.30% 
US$20  2.72  2.94  7.81% 
US$50  7.02  7.40  5.40% 
US$200  13.72  14.23  3.74% 
US$500  15.86  16.25  2.45% 
US$900  16.42  16.78  2.19% 
 